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1 Paradoxes, Anomalies,
and Hypotheses
Paradoxes
This book deals with unions and labor relations in Canada and the United
States. The rationale for the book can be found in the two diagrams that
follow: one showing the dramatic divergence that has developed in the per-
centage of employees belonging to unions in the United States and Canada
and the other showing the percentage of people who approve of unions in
both countries. Figure 1.1 shows how over the past four decades a huge gap
in the extent of union representation has emerged between the two coun-
tries. In 1963, 29 percent of employees in each country were union
members (Kumar 1993). By 2001, however, only 14 percent of employees
belonged to unions in the United States compared to 30 percent in
Canada. Figure 1.2 displays the results of cross-national surveys for the past
fifty years showing that Americans approve of unions far more than Cana-
dians do. Although a majority of people have approved of unions in both
countries (except for 1982 and the Anti-Inflation Board1 years of 1976 and
1978 in Canada), U.S. approval has exceeded Canadian approval in most
years from 1941 to 2001, in some cases by as much as 18 percentage points.
The few exceptions are close to the margin of error.
How can we explain this paradox? Why do Americans approve of unions
more than Canadians, yet since the mid-1960s have joined unions to a
much lesser extent? Indeed, how do we explain that even in Canada twice
as many people approve of unions as join them, and in the United States
approval of unions exceeds membership by more than fourfold?
Although these questions seem daunting enough to be the subject of a
book unto themselves, there is also a second paradox to be explored. A
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FIGURE 1.1
Union density in Canada and the United States, 1901-2001. (For data sources and method-
ology see app. A.)
80
50
70
60
~
v
c..
40
FIGURE 1.2
Union approval in Canada and the United States, 1941-2001 (Source: Gallup Poll,
http://www.gallup.com.)
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survey conducted for the authors suggests that U.S. managers are less
resistant to union organizing than Canadian managers (see app. B for a
description of the survey). This, like the general survey data already dis-
cussed, seems counterintuitive. One of the major explanations that has
been offered for lower union membership in the United States is that man-
agement is much more aggressive in opposing unions than is management
in Canada (e.g., Kochan, Katz and McKersie, 1994; Gomez, Lipset, and
Meltz 2001). In the United States there is even a highly visible industry pro-
viding advice to companies on how to avoid being unionized. Should we
conclude that the results of the surveys are not to be trusted? We do not
think so. Instead we believe that there are answers to these paradoxes, but
in order to resolve them we have to probe more deeply into the factors that
distinguish Americans from Canadians.
The Not-So Invisible Border
Americans and Canadians often refer to the world's longest undefended
border that separates them as an invisible border. At a superficial level,
there is some truth to this statement because there are few obvious differ-
ences between the two countries. In fact, Canada's largest city, Toronto, is
the third largest location for filming movies in North America, after Los
Angeles and New York, and, along with Vancouver and Montreal, often
substitutes for almost any U.S. city. Until recently, Vancouver was even the
location for the popular U.S. television program The XFiles. However, as
Lipset (1990) has shown previously, there are significant differences lying
below the surface in many of the attitudes and values of Americans and
Canadians. In this book, we plumb these differences to see whether they
contribute to the union representation gap between the two countries
and, if so, how.
This is not the first book to offer an explanation for divergent union-
ization trends in Canada and the United States. Since 1983 many studies
have suggested various reasons for the large gap that has emerged in the
extent of union membership between the two countries. A fuIllist of these
factors is discussed later, but among those that are considered to have the
greatest impact are labor laws and the nature and extent of the enforce-
ment of those laws by labor relations boards. v\That is not considered as
important are the differing attitudes and values of Americans and
Canadians that in large measure underpin these same laws and legal
institutions. To quote an expert analyst of the differences, "There is no
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empirical support for the hypothesis that the Canada-U.S. gap in union
coverage is due to differences between the two countries in the underlying
social attitudes toward unions" (Riddell 1993, 143). We hope to convince
our readers that there is indeed a relation between attitudes and the extent
of unionism, and that to locate it we must look beyond simple attitudinal
responses and instead examine the value systems of both countries.
Anomalies
Consider figure 1.1, which tells us about trade union membership in
Canada and the United States in the twentieth century. The figure shows
that both countries followed similar paths for the first half of the century.
Canada was somewhat ahead of the United States in union membership
rates during the first three decades of this century, and then the United
States led Canada from the late 1930S to the late 1950s. But apart
from these broadly congruent patterns, there are also some noticeable
differences.
Both countries experienced a surge in membership during World War 1,
but after that war ended, the U.S. membership rate dropped back to
prewar levels, whereas the decline in Canada was relatively less dramatic,
leaving the Canadian unionization rate at a much higher plateau than in
the prewar period. Figure 1.1 also indicates that for the entire twentieth
century, with the exception of only one or two years,- the only period in
which the United States had a higher union density rate (that is, propor-
tion of employed who are members) was during the period 1938-55, years
that included the end of the Great Depression of the 1930s, World War II,
and the early postwar period-the heyday of the New Deal.
Could it be that the exception proves the rule-that it took the extraor-
dinary conjunction of the Depression, government encouragement by the
New Deal administration ofFrankJin Delano Roosevelt, and the greatest war
in history to boost unions in the United States? This interpretation suggests
that the dramatic growth of unions in the 1930S through the early postwar
period may have been an anomaly. This is no way negates the fact that even
today pockets of union strength exist in the United States. The success of
unions such as the Auto Workers, the American Federation of Teachers and
the National Education Association, the Service Employees Union, and the
Teamsters brings the labor movement to more than 16 million workers.
But, in relation to the work force as a whole, the union sector has been con-
tinually eroding since the mid-1950s and especially after the late 197°S
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when the actual number of union members stopped growing and began to
decline. Private-sector union membersh{p in 2001 was g.o percent, lower
than the rate preceding World War 1. In Canada the comparable statistic in
the first half of 2001 was twice as high at 18.1 percent.
If the dramatic growth of unions in the United States for almost two
decades, beginning in the Depression, is an anomaly, why did it occur?
Does this mean that in the United States, bUt not in Canada, the share of
the workforce in unions increases only during wartime or peaceful periods
when there is strong government support? And are the workers who join
unions in Canada the same kind who belong to unions in the United States
or are there major differences? These questions are the subject matter of
this book.
Four Hypotheses
Central to our argument are four hypotheses aboUt the U.S. labor move-
ment that arise from sharp contrasts with Canada, which (even aside from
geographical proximity) resembles the United States economically and
socially more closely than any other country.
1. Although the experience of the Great Depression pushed both the
United ~tates and Canada toward the political left, Canada's strong social
democratic movement took root in a preexisting statist, communitarian
tradition. In the United States, the statist and communitarian values that
emerged during the Depression and lasted into the postwar years declined
under the impact of postwar prosperity. The country soon returned to an
individualistic state tradition that was not supportive of collectivist
approaches. The first hypothesis, therefore, is that the surge in union
membership relative to labor force growth in the United States from 1938
to 1958 was an anomaly in the overall U.S. experience with unionism, as
was the increase in union membership during World War 1.
2. If these gains were indeed an anomaly, how do we explain the appar-
ently high levels of public approval of unions? Union approval is high
across all fifty states, but a big majority express little confidence in unions,
less than for business (see Lipset and Schneider 1983)' There is historical
and comparative evidence that approval of unions tends to be negatively
related to the perceived power of unions; that is, the weaker unions are, or
at least appear to be, the more they are endorsed as an institution that is
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speaking for the interests of working people. This phenomenon has been
noted in the United Kingdom and Australia as welJ as in North America.
Public approval of unions has increased as their numerical strength has
faJJen. The second hypothesis is that, ironicaJJy, the greater historical
approval of unions in the United States is a result of the union movement's
relative weakness. We suggest that if unions were relatively stronger, as in
Canada, public support would be lower.
3. Evidence suggests that for the past several decades it has been more dif-
ficult to join a union in the United States than in Canada because the
underlying government institutions in the U.S. labor field-both the labor
legislation and enforcement of the legislation-have not been as support-
ive of unionization as they generaJJy have been in its northern neighbor.
Our third hypothesis is that a major component of the paradox in union-
ism is the greater difficulty that Americans have in joining unions com-
pared with Canadians. In other words, even though Americans express a
greater desire or willingness to join unions, they cannot join as easily as
Canadians, thereby perpetuating the weakness of the union movemen t and
leading to an ingrained rooting-for-the-underdog syndrome.
4. One final perplexing question stiJJ remains: If U.S. citizens realJy are
more desirous of unions and are prevented by state policies, why do U.S.
governments not change their behavior? The difference in culture and
values between the United States and Canada, we argue, is what contributes
significantly to limitations in political and legal support for unions in the
United States. Our fourth hypothesis is that in the choice between freedom
for the individual and coJJective rights for the group, more weight is given
to the individual than to the colJective in the United States, except in
extreme circumstances. Our fourth hypothesis also states that in Canada,
compared to the United States, more emphasis is placed on the common
good than on individual freedom. It is no accident, we argue, that the U.S.
Declaration of Independence speaks of an individual's ". . . right to life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness," whereas the Canadian Constitution
speaks of "peace, order and good government."
The evidence presented in this book clearly suggests that Americans do
want to join unions. Impeding them from joining is the U.S. emphasis on
individual freedom, combined with the peculiarities of Congressional gov-
ernment which make changes to labor law very difficult. This has led the
United States to maintain institutional barriers against unions. These bar-
riers have only broken down in extraordinary circumstances, such as those
occasioned by wars and depressions.
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In subsequent chapters we probe U.S. and Canadian views on a
range of subjects related to work, social values, and political institutions
to try to understand the apparent paradox that Americans approve
of unions more than Canadians do but join them less. The results
are based, in part, on an in-depth survey of over three thousand people,
mostly employees, conducted exclusively for the authors in the two
countries.
Structure of the Book
The book is organized into eleven chapters. Chapter 2 provides an inter-
national context for the analysis by examining trends in union member-
ship in industrialized countries in western Europe, Australia, New Zealand,
and Japan, along with the United States and Canada. The data in some
cases go back to 1900. The main finding that emerges from this cross-
country evidence is that support for unions is associated with social demo-
cratic strength.
Chapter 3 presents a historical overview of the evolution oftrade unions
in the United States and Canada from 1901 to 2001. Six subperiods are dis-
cussed: 1901-16, 1916-36, 1936-56, 1956-81, and 1981-2001. The focus
is on the patterns of change in union membership in the two countries
measured against the background of changes in the structure of the labor
movements, in labor legislation, and in the political context in which these
developments took place.
Three main observations emerge from this analysis. First, union density
has traditionally been higher in Canada, except for the period of the New
Deal (from the late 1930S to the late 195os). Second, the turning points in
union membership in both countries are associated with significant politi-
cal, social, and economic events-including wars, depressions, and
changed social attitudes-that caused a shift toward the rights of workers
being represented collectively in bargaining. In terms of Canadian-U.S.
patterns, the major finding in this context is the much greater freedom
that public-sector workers were given in Canada after the mid-1960s to
bargain and even strike. A final factor that affected private-sector workers
and the extent of union organizing and management opposition to unions
was the difference in labor legislation and its enforcement, which in
Canada was more union friendly.
Chapter 4 continues the discussion of the social, political, and economic
factors that underlie the more robust legislative protection and the much
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greater strength of unions in Canada than in the United States. It begins
with the examination of the results of our survey. The focus is on measures
of political culture in the two countries and how they differ, specifically
after the mid-lg60s when trade union membership in the two countries
parted ways. As a summary statement, it can be said that the ethos in the
United States is one of individualism and an appeal to exit, as opposed
to voice, as a means of protecting workers. In Canada, the underlying
dominant view is stilI largely a social democratic one.
Chapter 5 explores our two paradoxes. The first is the central paradox
of this book, that Americans approve of unions more than Canadians, but
are less likely to join. The second paradox is both counterintuitive and
counter to what most researchers in industrial relations believe: U.S. man-
agers are less hostile to unions than are Canadian managers. Our analysis
is based not only on what workers and managers in the two countries say
about unions, but on the broader societal attitudes and values that our
survey reveals. The findings of this chapter corroborate the extent of frus-
trated demand for unions that is examined later in chapter 6. But this
chapter also qualifies the extent of demand for unionization and differ-
ences in managers' attitudes toward unions.
Chapter 6 uses the results of our survey to measure the extent to which
there is a frustrated demand for union membership in the United States.
Using all the ways in which demand by workers to join unions could be
determined, one finding is absolutely clear: far more Americans want to
join unions than actually belong. More Canadians also want to join unions
than are members, but it is on the U.S. side that the extent of frustrated
demand easily outstrips observed membership rates.
Chapter 7 considers Canadian-U.S. union differences not from an
aggregate perspective but rather from differences in union density within
each country. What is most surprising is that differences within each
country, particularly within the United States, are far greater than are the
differences in the extent of union membership between the two countries.
A worker in New York state, for example, is seven times more likely to
belong to a union than a worker in North Carolina. That same worker in
New York is about five times more likely to belong to a union than the
average worker in Texas. Almost the same union density differences apply
in other high-density states such as Washington, Oregon, Alaska, and
Hawaii. One possible reason for these large interstate differences emerges
when we look at a map. As we see in chapter 7, the map reveals that the
closer a state is to the Canadian border, the higher the probability that its
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workers will be unionized. Is this a coincidence or is there some shared set
of values between border provinces and states?
Chapters 8 and 9 examine the attitudes and behaviors of white-collar
workers and professionals toward unions in the United States and Canada.
These populations are extremely important not only as occupations that
have been recent sources of strength for unions in both countries, but also
because their size and the changes that are taking place in the knowledge
economy provide measures that are harbingers for the future development
of unions on both sides of the border. This is part of the shift to a post-
industrial society and the decline in industrial work. The key for unions is
seen to be the combination of desire for representation and special needs
for professional development.
Chapter 10 looks at the location and extent of nonunion employee rep-
resentation. The issue we raise is whether nonunion forms of employee
representation are substitutes for, or complements to, formal union repre-
sentation. We find that a surprisingly high proportion of workers have
nonunion representation. In fact in the United States the proportion of
workers with such representation, 11 percent, is almost as great as the 14
percent who belong to a union (if we add the additional 2 percent of
workers who are covered by a collective agreement). The proportion of
employees covered in Canada by nonunion organizations is similar to the
United States (10 percent), but of course this is only one-third of the total
union representation. The differences that do exist between the two coun-
tries are explored, setting the stage for a discussion of what this means for
employee representation in the future.
Chapter 11 sums up the explanations for the paradoxes that have been
observed in union representation in the United States and Canada. It asks
whether, on the basis of this study, the future holds a turnabout in union
representation in the United States or whether, instead, Canada is destined
to decline to U.S.-style levels of union membership.
2 Union Density in a
Cross-National Context
This book deals primarily with the sources and consequences of the sizable
variation in union density and coverage between U.S. and Canadian
unions. In this chapter we provide an international context in which to
analyze the variation in union density between the two countries. After first
comparing differences in union density and collective agreement coverage
across twenty-four industrialized countries, we then examine the factors
affecting cross-national variation in union density.
Patterns of Union Density in Advanced Western Countries
Union density varies greatly among the different cultural and geographic
groupings of advanced Western countries. The range, using international
data from the mid-1990s, is from 88 percent in Sweden to 10-14 percent
in France and the United States. French unionism is actually much
stronger than this estimate of low membership suggests.! For collective
bargaining coverage, that is, the proportion of employees represented by
unions, France is close to the top, 95 percent, while the United States is at
the bottom, 16.7 percent. Canada is much more unionized, with 37
percent density and 40 percent coverage, clearly much more than its south-
ern neighbor but less than much of Europe (tables 2.1 and 2.2).
Union Dmsity, Dependent Collective Bargaining
Country Labor Force, 1995 Gmerage, 1990s"
Northern EurojJean countries 76.6 78.8
Sweden 87.5 85.0 (1995)
Iceland 83.3 n.a.
Finland 79.6 95.0 (1995)
Denmark 77.0 69.0 (1994)
Norway 55.4 66.0 (1996)
Low cou ntries 40.2 85.0
Belgium 52.9 90.0 (1994)
Luxembourg 43.4 l1.a.
Netherlands 24.3 80.0 (1996)
German-speaking countries 31.1 79.3
Austria 40.7 98.0 (1994)
Germany 29.1 90.0 (1996)
Switzerland 23.6 .~O.O (1993)
English-speaking countries 33.2 47.0
Ireland 52.3 90.0 (1994)
Canada 37.01> 40.0 (1994)
United Kingdom 36.4 47.0 (1994)
Australia 35.2 65.0 (1995)
New Zealand 24.3 23.1 (1995)
United States 14.2 16.7 (1995)
Southern EUTOPean countries 23.4 84.2
Italy 38.5 83.0 (1993)
Portugal 25.6 71.0 (1993)
Greece 24.3 90.0 (1994)
Spain 18.2 82.0 (1996)
France 10.3 95.0 (1995)
Outliers 23.5 n.a.
Japan 24.0 25.0 (1994)
Israel 23.0 n.a.
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TABLE 2.1
Union Density and Collective Bargaining Coverage in the Mid-1990S (%)
SaUTee: Daily Labor Report (Jan. 29, 1997); Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000); International Labour Organ-
isation ([ILO] 1997,248); Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation ([OECD] '997);
Traxler (1996. 274).
Note: The density data for Japan, Australia, and New Zealand (ILO
'997) are not adjusted. The '994
density data for Canada (OECD 1997) have a coverage rate somewhat higher than the density data for
Sweden, Denmark, and New Zealand. This discrepancy can be attributed to the fact that the estimates are
obtained from different sources and refer to different years (see OECD 1997,72,84).
~ B.a., not available. b For 1994-
Cultural and Geographic Groupings
The proportion of workers organized is highest in the northern European
countries. Union density in these nations exceeded 75 percent in 1995. It
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TABLE 2.2
Union Density in Developed Countries,
'950-'995, Ranked by '995 Estimates
Country 1950' 1960 1970 1980 1990 1995
Sweden 67.3 70.7 66.6 78.2 82.4 87.5
Finland 29.9 29.3 51.4 70.0 72.5 78.8
Denmark 53.2 60.2 62.1 77.5 74.5 78.]
Belgium 40.2 40.7 42.3 56.6 56.7 59.8
Norway n.a. 51.6 50.0 54.] 53.] 52.5
Ireland 38.9 45.8 54.2 57.4 48.2 44.4
Austria 57.9 57.8 55.4 50.8 45.2 38.9
Canada n.a. 28.3 29.8 36.0 36.0 37.0b
Australia n.a. 49.1 44.4 48.0 41.0 35.2
Italy 40.3 22.4 34.0 44.4 33.6 32.4
United Kingdom 44.1 44.3 48.6 52.8 40.] 32.2
Germany 33.9 34.2 31.8 33.6 29.9 26.5
New Zealand n.a. 54.0 46.1 56.0 45.0 24.3
Japan n.a. 32.2 34.5 31.0 25.0 24.0
Netherlands 42.0 41.0 36.0 32.4 22.3 22.9
Switzerland n.a. n.a. 29.9 30.7 26.3 22.7
United States n.a. 28.9 25.9 22.0 ]6.0 14.2
France 30.2 19.2 21.0 17.1 9.2 8.6
Source: Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000); OECD (1997); ILO (1997); Visser (1994,1993).
Nole: Percentage of employed wage and salary earners. The 1980 and
'990 data for the Uniled States,
Canada (including '994),japan, Australia, and New Zealand (OECD 1997) and the 1995 data for these
countries (ILO 1997) are not adjusted.
.\ 11.a., not available.
h For 1994.
is 88 percent in Sweden, 83 percent in Iceland, 79-80 percent in Finland,
and 77-78 percent in Denmark.2 A smaller proportion, but still more than
one-half of wage and salary workers or the dependent labor force (53-55
percent), is unionized in Norway (see tables 2.1 and 2.2). With the excep-
tion of Finland, the northern countries form a culturally uniform group.
Union density in the nations with populations of European origin and
that have been part of the British Commonwealth is much lower than in
northern countries. Ireland is the most unionized of this group, with about
one-half of the dependent labor force (52 percent), or 44 percent of the
gainfully employed, unionized compared to 32-36 percent in the United
Kingdom. The membership rates in Australia and Canada are similar to
that of Britain-in Australia it is more than one-third (35 percent), and it
is about the same in Canada-while the rate in New Zealand is lower at
one-fourth (24 percent). The United States is the lowest, with only one-
seventh (14 percent) of its wage and salary earners as union members.
Collective bargaining coverage, the other measure of union strength, is low
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in English-speaking countries compared with the other regional culture
groups. With the exception of Ireland and Australia, the rate in the
English-speaking world is less than one-half, while in all other countries for
which data are available, except japan, it ranges from 50 to 95 percent
(table 2.1).
Union densities in the Low Countries, German-speaking nations, and
southern European nations, plus the outliers, japan and Israel, are also
lower than in northern European countries. However, there is significant
variation among them. More than one-half of the dependent labor force or
gainfully employed workers (53-60 percent) are union members in
Belgium. In contrast, union density in Luxembourg is 43 percent and in
the Netherlands the rate is less than one-quarter (23-24 percent) (see
tables 2.1 and 2.2).
Austria leads the German-speaking nations with about two-fifths of the
dependent labor force (41 percent), or of the gainfully employed (39
percent), as union members as of 1995. In Germany, the density figures are
slightly over one-quarter (27-29 percent). In Switzerland, which is over
two-thirds German-speaking, fewer than one in four workers (23-24
percent) belong to unions.
The southern European countries are culturally Latin and Catholic,
with the exception of Greece. In Italy, about one-third of gainfully
employed workers (32 percent), or the dependent labor force (39
percent), belongs to labor unions. In contrast, the union membership rate
in France is much lower, 9-10 percent. One in four (26 percent) wage and
salary workers in Portugal is a union member, while in Spain union density
is lower-depending on the definition, 14 percent of gainfully employed
workers or 18 percent of the dependent labor force belong to unions in
Spain. The union membership rate in Greece is 24 percent.
Two quite different outlier industrialized countries, japan and Israel,
report similar rates, 24 and 23 percent in 1995. In the past, the rate for the
Israeli Histadrut was much higher, but it was more than a union, including
many nonworkers because it provided a variety of social welfare functions,
such as medical coverage and pensions. Its membership also included
many pensioners. As a result, Israeli union density was estimated at 80
percent in 1979 (Wallerstein 1989, 482). But by the mid-1990s, after it
gave up these functions, the unionization rate declined to 23 percent
(table 2.1).
Although culture (predominantly political culture) seems to be linked
to these considerable differences in union density, it has proven very diffi-
cult to order and estimate cultural variables in a fashion that permits sta-
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tistical analysis. We have, for example, no good measures of the degree of
class awareness or class consciousness in various countries, unless we rely
on left party voting. But, such parties themselves are too varied in ideology
to be of use. In general, the cross-national analysis of union density is com-
plicated because of the large number of independent variables and the
relatively small number of countries.3 Many factors associated with
cross-national variation are difficult to quantity. The unreliability of the
international data also complicates statistical analysis. Measures of density
and collective bargaining coverage are not always consistent and compati-
ble because of differences in methodology and data collection. National
definitions of union members and labor force measures vary. For instance,
Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000) and Visser (] 994) calculate union density as
the ratio of union members to the dependent labor force and to the gain-
fully employed. The first measure includes the unemployed, but the
second does not. Also the unionization estimates in some countries (e.g.,
the United Kingdom and Ireland) include economically inactive union
members, and the comparative data on collective bargaining coverage are
derived from different sources (see tables 2.1 and 2.2).
Factors Affecting Cross-National Variation in Union Density
A number of studies have looked at union density in industrialized Western
countries and analyzed the factors behind cross-national and temporal
variations (e.g., Ebbinghaus and Visser 1999, 2000; Golden, Wallerstein,
and Lange 1999; Western 1997; Visser 1993, 1994; Ebbinghaus 1993;
Blanchflower and Freeman 1992; Neumann, Pedersen, and Westergard-
Nielsen 1991; Stephens 1991; Freeman 1990; Wallerstein 1989). Most of
the studies focus on cross-national variations in union density at a given
time. The historical data required for a longitudinal cross-national analysis
are not always available or reliable. Nevertheless, we can report that the
rank order of countries according to unionization level has remained rela-
tively stable over the postwar period (Visser 1994, 165). The intertemporal
association is also quite strong. The correlation between 1995 and 1970 of
union densities among eighteen Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) countries is 0.81 (calculated from Visser's data
reported in table 2.2).
We have analyzed the determinants of union membership rates in 1995
among the employed wage and salary earners in advanced OECD coun-
tries. The independent variables reflect various political, structural, eco-
Union Density in a Cross-National Context 15
nomic, and religious cleavages as formulated in Lipset and Rokkan's
(1967) analysis of cross-national political variation. Variables identified in
other studies of unionization are also included in the analysis.
The folloV\~ng indexes, which provide a quantitative assessment of
various factors that appear to affect union density, have been used: left
cumulative power (how long left parties have held national office);
Catholic cumulative power (how long Catholic parties have held national
office); corporatism; legal regulation of labor relations; and religious,
political, and economic divisions in union systems. Our independent
variables also include the Ghent system, labor force size, the proportion
employed in government and private industry, the state's share of GDP
revenue, the extent of ethnolinguistic diversity, and the religious composi-
tion of the population (table 2.3).01
The RelationshiP between Left Parties and Union Strength
Unions and left parties have been seen as different parts of same move-
ment. Comparative analyses of labor organizations points to their varied
relationships with left parties, for example, social democratic, labor, social-
ist, and communist. In some countries, left parties were basically an off-
spring of the trade union movement; in others, the labor organizations
were created by the political movements or developed in parallel with
them. Unions played a significant role in the founding of left parties in
Great Britain and other English-speaking countries, as well as in Scandi-
navia. United States is the exception (Marks 1989; Western 1997,67-69).
The variations in the historical patterns of union formation and party-
union relationships have been related to differences in cleavage structure
(see Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Lipset 1983; Ebbinghaus 1993, 1996;
Western 1997,67-69).
Class-consciousness has traditionally been strong in the Scandinavian
countries. Unions founded social democratic parties in Sweden and
Denmark and the Labor party in Norway by the end of the nineteenth
century. In Iceland, then a dependent territory of Denmark, the Icelandic
Federation of Labor acted also as the Social Democratic Party from the
time of its founding by unions in 1916 (Ebbinghaus 1996; Kjartansson
1992) .
Similarly, unions were involved in the formation oflabor parties in Great
Britain, Ireland, Australia, and New Zealand (Western 1997,67-69). Labor
activists took part in the formation of the first electorally viable social
democratic party in Canada, the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation
TABLE 2.3
Political, Structural, and Economic Characteristics of Eighteen OECD Countries
Gov('rl1m~nt Industry
Left Catholic Proportion Employed lfflvern men t Employm""t. EmPloymmt.
Cumulative Cumulative of Catholic and Revenue, 1995 1995 !-Pgal
Power, Power, Corporatism Ethnolinguistic Population Unemployed 1995 (% (% total (% total Regulation Orruj}alional Religious Political
Cauntr)' 1946-94 1946-94 Index FractionalizaJion (%) (millions) ofGDP! employment) emPloyment) I nde.~ Split Sl)lit Split
Sweden 3R.86 0 1.70 0.065 1.4 4.27 57.4 32.0 25.0 ]6 40 0 0
Denmark 26.9] 0 1.60 0.028 0.6 2.73 59.] 30.5 26.R ]6 2] 0 0
Finland ]9.29 0 1.80 0.]05 0.1 2.47 53.2 25.1 26.R ]6 34 0 0
Norway 36.88 0 1.80 0.070 0.3 2.]2 50.5 30.6 23.4 ]6 ]R 0 0
Belgium 15.87 26.06 1.30 0.364 90.0 4.20 50.8 ] 9.4 27.7 ]5 0 0 53
New Zealand 16.25 0 0.95 0.]4R ]8.7 1.70 o.a. 22.1 24.9 14 0 0 0
Australia ]8.77 0 1.10 0.113 29.6 8.78 34.2 ]6.6 23.5 ]4 24 0 0
Austria 30.54 ]8.05 1.80 0.033 88.8 3.88 47.3 22.4 33.2 ]5 0 0 0
Ireland 4.R6 0 1.15 0.090 95.3 1.42 38.9 13.4 27.6 11 0 0 0
United Kingdom 16.]6 0 0.95 0.106 13.] 28.32 37.3 ]4.4 27.7 II 0 0 0
Italy 5..57 38.65 0.75 0.039 83.2 22.72 44.5 ]6.1 32.1 ]3 0 34 63
Germany ]2.3] 0 ].40 0.044 35.0 39.22 45.9 ]5.9 37.6 ]2 ]3 3 0
Canada 0 0 0.80 0.376 46.6 ]4.R3 46.7 ]9.6 22.6 JO 0 3 0
Switzerland 12.50 13.83 ].40 0.308 52.8 3.9] 37.4 ]4.0 28.R ]4 ]7 ]3 0
Japan 0.8] 0 0.40 O.OJO 0.6 66.45 32.2 6.0 34.0 10 0 0 51
Netherlands ] 1.11 ]4.02 ].40 0.063 42.6 7.]2 51.6 ]2.7 23.0 ]5 ]3 20 0
United States 0 0 0.85 0.209 30.0 ]31.06 31.7 ]4.0 24.0 9 ]5 0 0
France 12.59 3.97 0.60 0.]46 76.4 24.87 46.8 24.8 26.7 ]2 22 4
.'i5
Source: Huber, Ragin, and Stephens (1997); La Porta et al. (1998); "OECD in Figures" (1997); Redding and Vitern a (1999); Wessels (1996).
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(CCF), and played a significant role in the organization of the New
Democratic Party (NDP), the CCF's successor (Horowitz 1968; Lipset
1996, 96; Meltz 1985, 326). But in contrast to other English-speaking
countries, unions in the United States never created or supported their
own labor or social democratic party (Lipset and Marks 2000, 85-112;
Marks 1989).
Unions in Germany were formed under the influence of socialist and
labor parties that later formed the Social Democratic Party (Marks 1989;
Verberckmoes 1996a). Labor organizations in Austria and Finland devel-
oped in parallel with social democratic and socialist parties. In Switzerland,
Belgium, and Netherlands, the ties of emerging union movements with left
parties were weakened by the church-state cleavage, which led to the
formation of Christian unions (see Broeck 1992; Ebbinghaus 1993, 1996;
Gruner 1992; Pasture 1996; Schonhoven 1992; Soikkanen 1992; Voorden
1992). Reformist-revolutionary ideological differences fragmented organ-
ized labor in France, Italy, and Spain, countries in which the church-state
cleavage was also strong. Unions in these Latin countries initially devel-
oped under the influence of syndicalists and anarchists; hence, they
formed separately from socialist parties. In these nations, the power of the
ideologically revolutionary anarchosyndicalists facilitated strong commu-
nist parties, with strength among unions (see Bianchi 1996; Ebbinghaus
1993, 1996; Esenwein 1992; Verberckmoes 1996b). The strength ofrevo-
lutionary parties and unions in the Latin societies is related to the late
development of a full-grown industrial system and state repression of
working-class political and economic rights (Lipset 1983).
The differences in historical origins and links of left parties and unions
affect their present relationships. Left parties that were originally formed
by unions continue to have much closer organizational and political ties
with organized labor (Western 1997,67-69)' Scandinavian countries rep-
resent an example of this relationship (Galenson 1998). In contrast, links
between left parties and unions are weaker where they emerged inde-
pendently of one another.
Previous cross-national studies have reported a strong and significant
relationship between the strength ofleft parties in government and union-
ization levels (see Stephens 1991; Visser 1994; Wallerstein 1989; Western
1997). Our statistical analysis indicates that the index of left cumulative
power strongly correlates with union density in eighteen OECD countries.
The left cumulative power index, developed by Huber, Ragin, and
Stephens (1997) and based on the percentage of parliamentary seats held
by left parties in government from 1946 to 1994, correlates positively with
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union density (0.63). The association holds when tested in multivariate
regressions and is statistically significant at p < 0.10 (figure 2.1).5
Left parties have never been represented in the national governments of
the United States and Canada (table 2.3). Social democratic parties,
however, have had considerable strength at the provincial level in Canada,
much more than in the U.S. states. This is particularly important because
provincial governments are responsible for labor legislation that covers
approximately go percent of the Canadian work force. Since the 197°s,
social democratic parties have on various occasions governed in five of the
ten provinces and the territory of the Yukon. In the early 1990s, three NDP
governments (Ontario, British Columbia, and Saskatchewan) covered
more than one-half the Canadian population, while the Parti Quebecois
was the governing party of Quebec. The Parti Quebecois tried to affiliate
with the Socialist International but was prevented from doing so by the
NDP, which had the right to prevent another Canadian party from joining.
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Social democratic parties and labor Ul1lons clearly have been much
stronger north of the border.
Beyond reflecting working-class values, social democratic strength
affects the legal environment in which unions operate, a factor obviously
related to union bargaining power. An index of legal regulation of labor
relations is very strongly associated with the left cumulative power index
(0.81 ).fi Left governments are more likely to provide state support for
unions during conflicts, as well as union-friendly legislation. The latter, as
expected, is positively correlated with union density in the eighteen OECD
countries (0.62).
The Ghent System
The Ghent system, in which unions are involved in administration of
unemployment insurance schemes, is very favorable for unionization. This
system originated in Belgium when the local governments started to subsi-
dize unemployment funds run by unions, but its development has varied in
different periods and countries. The Ghent system now exists in Belgium,
Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, all of which have very high unionization
rates. The other advanced Western countries have public unemployment
insurance schemes (see Galenson 1998; Western 1997).
Because trade unions run unemployment insurance funds and pay
unemployment benefits, many workers in these countries remain union
members even when they lose thei,-jobs. The Ghent system is also favorable
to unionism because it gives unions control over labor market competition
(Western 1997, 55-56). The Ghent system dummy variable is highly cor-
related with union density (0.87). However, it is also associated with the
cultural and geographic cluster of northern European countries to which
all these nations, except Belgium, belong.
A comparison of otherwise similar countries within the same cluster with
and without the Ghent system allows us to better evaluate its effect on the
unionization rate. Among the Low Countries, Belgium has a much higher
union density than the Netherlands. Similarly, the unionization rate in
Sweden exceeds the rate in Norway, which lacks the Ghent system (see
table 2.1; Western 1997,57).
Corporatism
Some cross-national studies seek to evaluate the effect of corporatism on
union density. Corporatism generally refers to systems in which business,
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unions, and government negotiate regularly with one another on eco-
nomic issues. The literature focuses on varying aspects of corporatism and
employs somewhat different indicators. Nevertheless, the various indexes
of corporatism tend to be positively intercorrelated (see Pennings and
Vergunst 2000). Our index reflects the organizational unity oflabor and
scope of collective bargaining in 1970-90.7 The corporatism and left
power indexes are highly correlated (0.78), a finding reported by Wilensky
(1981) and Western (1994). Corporatism clearly has a social democratic
character.
Other researchers report that corporatism has significant positive effects
on union density in advanced Western countries (Ebbinghaus and Visser
1999; Freeman 1990).8 Our corporatism index is correlated with union
density (0.67); the finding is statistically significant in a regression analysis
(figure 2.1). Government involvement in collective bargaining is one of
the core elements of corporatism (Lange, Wallerstein, and Golden 1995,
87). Government and parliamentary participation in bargaining is posi-
tively associated with union density in sixteen OECD countries (Golden
and Londregan 1998, 7).9 Correlations between these two variables and
the union membership rate in 1995 are 0.36 and 0.63 respectively.
Occupational, Ethnic, and Linguistic Cleavages
Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000) report that the differences in levels of union
organization among countries are similar to a large degree to the analysis
of party systems and structural cleavages of Lipset and Rokkan (1967).
They also report that the strength of union movements cross-nationally are
linked to the depth of the labor-capital cleavage and the extent of the status
gap between nonmanual white-collar and professional employees and
manual workers.
The high unionization rate in the Scandinavian countries has been
attributed to the organization of white-collar and professional employees
(Galenson 1998, 133). As of 1985, white-collar union density was 79
percent in Denmark, 71 percent in Sweden, and 62 percent in Norway,
compared to 51 percent in Austria, 45 percent in Britain, 34 percent in
Switzerland, 28 percent in Germany, and 25 percent in the Netherlands.1O
There is a significant correlation between the overall national union
membership rates and intraclass variations in union strength, 0-46.]] The
measure of the latter indicates the relative strength of white-collar, profes-
sional, and other occupationally based unions (see Wessels 1996; table 2.3).
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The examination of the effects of ethnic diversity produces ambiguous
results. Visser (] 994) and Stephens (] 991), as well as our own analysis, find
limited support for the hypothesis that ethnic heterogeneity hampers
union organizing. There is even less significant evidence of support for the
linguistic diversity hypothesis. Using the ethnic diversity index employed by
Stephens (]99]) we find a negative, but not statistically significant, rela-
tionship with union density. Similarly, our use of an ethnolinguistic frac-
tionalization index, derived from La Porta and colleagues (] 998), does not
yield significant regression results.
Catholic Parties Power and Religion
Christian Democratic party strength is associated with unionization (Misra
and Hicks] 994, 304). Wilensky (] 981) notes that Catholic party power is
as important a source of welfare state development as left party power.
Catholic-based parties favor unionization, albeit by Christian union con-
federations, which exist in several western European countries, but a
religious confederation represents the majority of union members in
only one nation, Belgium (see Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000, 46; Western
]997,80-83).
Our analysis indicates that a Catholic cumulative power index, which
measures Catholic parties seats as a percentage of seats held by all govern-
ment parties in ]946-94, does not significantly correlate with union
density in multivariate regressions (Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1997).
The proportion of Catholics in the population is negatively related to
union strength in our statistical analysis (see also Misra and Hicks 1994).
Conversely, our Protestant variable is positively associated with density, that
is, unions are stronger in Protestant than Catholic countries.]2
Economic Factors
Our statistical analysis indicates that the size of the labor market, defined
as the log of the] 994 employed and unemployed population, is negatively
associated with union density in the eighteen industrialized Western coun-
tries (figure 2.1). The correlation coefficient is -0.57. Country size is of
obvious importance. It may be noted that the majority of small countries
have strong labor movements: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway, and Sweden. Union density,
however, is low in Greece, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, and
Switzerland compared with larger countries inside their cultural areas.
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Such large countries as the United States, Japan, and Germany, have low
density. Wallerstein (] 98g) seeks to explain the relationship by noting that
in countries with larger labor markets, unions face higher costs of organiz-
ing additional union members. He points out (] 98g, 487) that union
organizing is especially expensive in the United States, which has the
biggest labor market in the industrialized world.
This finding that union membership rates are higher in smaller coun-
tries, however, may be a spurious one. Stephens (] 99]) points out that
labor-force size is highly correlated with economic concentration, a vari-
able that may be used as a proxy for industrial structure.J3 Such a high cor-
relation (-o.go) in a small sample results in a multicollinearity problem.
Statistical analyses are not able to distinguish the relative effect of these
factors because of the very strong link between the two independent
variables.
Union membership rates vary greatly among different industries and
sectors of employment. In most advanced countries, it is higher in
manufacturing and tl1e public-sector than elsewhere in the economy
(Ebbinghaus 1993, 186; Western 1997, 125)' Curiously, measures of
industrial and occupational structures, such as the proportion of wage
and salary earners employed in industry (manufacturing, mining, utilities,
and construction), public-sector, or blue-collar occupations, have no sig-
nificant effects on union density when tested cross-nationally (Visser] 994,
177; Wallerstein 1g8g). Our computations also show that the proportion
in industrial employment does not significantly affect the union member-
ship rate. Estimates of trade dependence, such as the proportion of
the merchandise exports in the GDP, produce similar results (Visser
1994) .
The extent of government employment as of 1995 is positively corre-
lated with union density, but our analysis indicates that this relationship is
not significant when controlled for size of labor force and the Jeft power
index. The proportion of government revenues in the GDP is similarly
associated with union density. These variables, of course, correlate highly
with the left-party index, which leads again to a multicollinearity problem.
Causation may also run in the opposite direction (Ebbinghaus and Visser
1999, 148).
As can be seen from the results reported earlier, cross-national statistical
analysis of union density in advanced Western countries has its limits. The
number of countries is small and comparable data are not always available.
Moreover, there are many independent structural, economic, and political
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variables that can logically be posited to affect union density. Correlations
are often difficult to interpret, and as our treatment of the left power,
legal regulation of labor relations, and corporatism indices illustrates,
union-linked variables are often interrelated. Multivariate regressions
are problematic, given the interaction between independent variables or
interconnected effects.
Cultural Clusters
To reiterate, union density and collective bargaining rates vary greatly
within the English-speaking and European clusters, that is among northern
European, southern European, German-speaking, and the Low countries.
Statistical analysis cannot account for the differences among these cultural
groupings (see Ebbinghaus and Visser 1999,150). In contrast to the other
culture regions, union densities in the highly unionized northern
European countries have remained stable or even increased since 1980.
Social democratic, class, and corporatist traditions and the Ghent system
are especially strong in these states, all of which are small and Protestant
(table 2.3). Norway is somewhat of an exception because its density and
collective agreement coverage rates are significantly below the other north-
ern European countries and it does not follow the Ghent system. There are
greater absolute differences in these rates between Norway and Sweden
(19 percentage points on coverage and 32 points on density) than tl1ere
are between the United States and Canada (23 points on coverage and 23
points on density). In relative terms, however, the U.S.-Canadian gap is
greater.
Union density differs greatly among the Low Countries. Belgium, which
has the Ghent system, is the most highly organized country in the group,
whereas the Netherlands has a much lower unionization rate. These two
occupy the middle ground on the index of corporatism in 1970-90 (table
2.3). Belgium has the strongest Christian unions among advanced Western
countries.
Membership rates also vary considerably among the southern European
countries; the range between the highest, Italy, and the lowest, France, is
quite large. However, collective bargaining coverage among them and the
Low Countries is uniformly high (table 2.1). These two groups of countries
are Catholic, with the exception of Greece, which is Orthodox, and the
Netherlands, which has about equal proportions of Catholics and
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Protestants. Among the German-speaking countries, Germany and Switzer-
land stand in the middle of the range on density. However, Austria, the
smalJest country, has the highest levels of union density, coverage, and cor-
poratism in this group (table 2.1).
Both union density and collective bargaining rates differ significantly
among English-speaking countries. Union density is highest in Ireland, the
smaJIest country in the group. Ireland has almost one and one-half times
higher the unionization rate and two times the bargaining coverage of
Great Britain. The same pattern of variation applies to Australia and New
Zealand. Union density in Australia is almost one and one-half times
higher than New Zealand, and the coverage rate is almost three times
higher.
As we have stressed, the United States and Canada, two neighbor-
ing, predominantly English-speaking societies with similar economic struc-
tUres, have shown considerable divergence in union density and political
culture (Lipset 1996, 77-109; 1986; 1990; Meltz 1985; Ig8gb; 1990;
Western 1997, 18). Union density in Canada in the mid-1990s (37
percent) was more then two times higher than in the United States (14
percent). The collective bargaining coverage rate in Canada (40 percent)
also exceeds that in the United States (17 percent) by more than two times.
Corporatism does not differentiate, given that in the English-speaking
countries, including the United States and Canada, it is generally very
weak.
As noted, Canada is much more social democratic in its values and social
policies than the United States; the majority of its provinces and popula-
tion have been governed by social democratic parties, whereas few states
in the United States have. The exceptional weakness of labor unions in
the United States would appear to be linked to the same factors as
those related to the absence of a visible socialist or labor party (Lipset
and Marks 2000). A systematic comparison of the two nations, made possi-
ble by the 1996 Lipset-Meltz survey data and qualitative and historical
materials, allows us to overcome some of the methodological problems
posed by the too-few-countries, too-many-variables problem that under-
mines statistical research. Clearly, the comparative study of variation in
trade union support would benefit much by case study analyses of the vari-
ations within smalJ national clusters (e.g., the Low and southern European
countries) .
The picture is somewhat different when looking at the extent of collec-
tive bargaining coverage in the advanced Western countries. The over-
whelming majority of employed people in two low-density Latin countries,
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France and Spain, are covered by collective bargaining, % percent in the
first and 82 percent in the second. A similar pattern exists in Greece and
Italy. The coverage rate in Greece was 90 percent in 1994, and in Italy it
was 83 percent in 1993.
Collective bargaining coverage is much weaker in English-speaking
nations (Adams 1995)' In Ireland, which is an exception to this generaliza-
tion, 9° percent of workers are covered by collective bargaining. Collective
bargaining coverage and union density, defined in terms of the dependent
labor force, are closely related with one another in the United States (17
and 14 percent), Canada, (4° and 37 percent), New Zealand (24 and 23
percent), and japan (25 and 24 percent). In Great Britain and Australia,
the coverage rates (47 and 65 percent) are notably higher than densities
(36 and 35 percent) (see table 2.1).
The Gap between Collective Agreement Coverage and Union Density
What causes collective agreement coverage to differ from the union mem-
bership rate? In the United States and Canada, a contract negotiated by a
union certified to represent employees in a bargaining unit covers all
employees in the unit, whether or not they belong to a union. Because not
all employees in the bargaining unit join the union, there will be a gap
between collective agreement coverage and the union membership rate.
Similar factors are at play in the narrow gaps in japan and New Zealand.
Since 1980, the relative decline in the union membership rate was largest
in New Zealand (table 2.2).14 Union density in New Zealand in 1995 was
less than one-half the rate in 1980. This drop has been attributed to the
deregulation of the labor market (Harbridge and Honeybone 1996). In
many countries, industry sector agreements negotiated between an
employers' association and union(s) are extended to cover all employees
in the industry. In addition, some governments make provision for wage-
rate extensions. Deregulation is usually accompanied by the elimination of
these industry extension provisions.
Why should any employee want to join a union and pay union dues if
the industry or the government determines their terms and conditions of
employment? Why not be a free rider? Although there is no statistically
significant inverse relationship, if the northern European countries are
excluded along with the United States, Canada, japan, and New Zealand,
there is a huge gap between coverage and density rates in a large number
of countries (France, Greece, Spain, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands,
